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ANTITRUST LAW AND HEALTH PLANNING UNDER
THE NATIONAL HEALTH PLANNING AND RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974
In recent years one of the most intensely debated issues in the area
of antitrust law has been the extent to which traditional antitrust prin-
ciples apply to the health care industry.1 Of primary concern to the legal
and health care communities is the perceived conflict between antitrust
laws and federal health planning legislation.2 As the cost of health care
increases at a rate faster than the rate of inflation,3 advocates of antitrust
enforcement argue that the competitive market structure provided by the
antitrust laws offers the most effective means of restraining spiralling
medical costs.4 Health planning advocates, however, claim that defects
I See, e.g., M. THOMPSON, ANTITRUST AND THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER 25 (1979) (ap-
plication of antitrust laws to health planning activities is problematic); Bovbjerg, Competi-
tion Versus Regulation in Medical Care: An Overdrawn Dichotomy, 34 VAND. L. REV. 965,
966 (1981) (competitive approach to reforming medical care raises many policy issues); Drake
& Kozak, A Primer on Antitrust and Hospital Regulation, 3 J. HEALTH PoL., POL'y & L.
328, 332 (1978) (unique characteristics of health care industry limit effectiveness of antitrust
approach to market problems); Horan & Nord, Application of Antitrust Law to the Health
Care Delivery System, 9 Cum. L. REV. 685, 685-86 (1979) (antitrust laws are incompatible
with many practices in health provider system); Rosoff, Antitrust Laws and the-Health. Care
Industry: New Warriors into an Old Battle, 23 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 446, 449 (1979) (major
obstacles exist in application of antitrust laws to health care field); Note, Antitrust and
Health Planning Under the 1974 NHPRD Act, 7 J. CORP. L. 311, 311-12 (1982) (increases in
antitrust litigation against health providers raise tension between health planning laws
and antitrust principles) [hereinafter cited as Health Planning].
2 See infra notes 101-62 and accompanying text (cases construing planning legislation
and antitrust laws).
See N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1983, at A8, col. 1. The latest figures on the cost of medical
care indicate that health care costs increased 11% in 1981 or almost three times as much
as the Consumer Price Index for all items. Id. The 11% annual inflation rate was the third
highest since the federal government began reporting on health care costs in 1935. Id. The
leading medical expenditure was health insurance, which rose 15.9% in 1981. Id. One authority
projects that spending in the health industry may reach $500 billion by 1985, with approx-
imately 40% of the expenditures devoted to hospital care. Reilly & Legge, The Embattled
Hospital: Cost Control Measures Versgs Imperatives for Expansion, 7 J. HEALTH POL., POL'VY
& L., 254, 254-55 (1982).
' See Leibenluft & Pollard, Antitrust Scrutiny of the Health Professions: Developing
a Framework for Assessing Private Restraints, 34 VAND. L. REV. 927, 930-31 (1981) (increases
in costs of medical and hospital care prompted reformers to consider market-oriented reforms);
see also Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978
DUKE L.J. 303, 304-05 (1978). Proponents of vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws against
concerted health care actions argue that the antitrust laws could stimulate the growth of
private cost-containment initiatives. Id. at 305. In light of the recent increase in antitrust
litigation against the health care industry, advocates for change in the present system of
health financing perceive real possibilities for the development of alternative modes of finan-
cing plans. Id.; see infra notes 194-98 and accompanying test (health delivery and financing
plans developed as alternatives to current system of third-party payment plans).
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in the health care market are curable only through a planning scheme
that seeks to control costs and avoid unnecessary duplication of health
services through allocation of resources and restriction of entry into the
market.' A fundamental antagonism thus exists between the anti-
competitive elements of health planning regulation and the antitrust ob-
jective of regulation through the operation of competitive forces in the
marketplace.' The background for the conflict stems from the antagonism
existing between the procompetitive provisions of the Sherman Antitrust
Act of 18701 (Sherman Act) and the anticompetitive provisions and policies
of the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 19748
(Planning Act).
I See Note, Health Law - The Conflict with Antitrust Law, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
591, 598 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Conflict]. Health planning advocates maintain that plan-
ning will cure present health care defects. Id. Planning proponents also hope that planning
goals will achieve equity of access to quality care at a reasonable cost while improving
the inadequate distribution of health services. Id.; see Blumstein & Sloan, Health Planning
and Regulation Through Certificate of Need: An Overie, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 3, 6 (1978).
In justifying health planning, planning proponents reason that the present medical market
place perpetuates inefficiency, permits excessive cost escalation, and fails to curtail un-
necessary duplication of health services. Id.
I See infra notes 9-99 and accompanying text (elements of health planning regulation
and antitrust laws).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Sherman Act); see infra notes 64-77 and
accompanying text (discussion of Sherman Act). In addition to the Sherman Act, the Clayton
Act of 1914 provides substantive antitrust law. See id at SS 12-27 (Clayton Act). Section
3 of the Clayton Act forbids exclusive dealings and tying arrangements where the effect
of the illegal conduct may be to lessen competition substantially or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce. Id. at S 14. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits corporate
acquisitions where the effect may be to lessen competition substantially or to tend to create
a monopoly. Id. at 5 18. Section 7 is applicable to the health care industry when providers
attempt to create joint venture corporations, to eliminate duplicate services, or to capture
markets. M. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 13. Congress limited remedies under the Clayton
Act to treble damage actions and suits for injunctive relief. 15 U.S.C. §5 15, 26 (1976 &
Supp. v 1981).
In addition to the Clayton Act, Congress also passed the Federal Trade Commission
Act (FTC Act) in 1914. See id. at §5 41-58. The FTC Act empowers the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) to conduct investigations of possible unfair methods of competition and to
issue trade regulation rules that establish standardt preventing unfair and deceptive prac-
tices. Id. at S 45(m) (1) (A) & (B), 46, 46(g), 57a. The agency has extensive enforcement
powers including injunctions, civil money penalties, voluntary agreements and consent orders.
Id. at §§ 45(b), 45(1), 46. The Act's application to health care matters, however, is subject
to a major limitation pertaining to the FTC Act's definition of a corporation. See id. at
S 44. Under the FTC Act, the definition of corporation excludes entities that operate on
a nonprofit basis. Id. Since many health care institutions are nonprofit entities, the FTC
Act does not provide for FTC jurisdiction over substantial areas of potential antitrust activity.
See M. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 15 (FTC has no jurisdiction over nonprofit health care
providers). The FTC does have enforcement jurisdiciton, however, over nonprofit associa-
tions organized for the profit of their members, such as the American Medical Association.
Id See generally Rosoff, supra note 1, at 451-53 (discussion of Federal Trade Commission Act).
8 42 U.S.C. S§ 300k-300t (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act (Planning Act) is not the first congressional attempt at legislating
[Vol. 40:1505
ANTITRUST AND HEALTH PLANNING
The concept of health planning, as detailed in the Planning Act, is
the result of congressional concern over the continued increases in the
cost of health care and the misallocation of health services.' Generally,
proponents of health planning justify government involvement in the plan-
ning process on the basis of two rationales." The first rationale is that
government intervetion in the medical marketplace through planning is
necessary because the health care sector deviates from traditional market
principles.11 The second rationale maintains that health planning can aid
in achieving governmental health policy goals.12
health care planning. See M. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 27-28 (synopsis of governmental
health planning legislation). Congressional action on health care planning and control
originated with the enactment of the Hill-Burton Hospital Survey and Construction Act
of 1946 (Hill-Burton Act). Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 5, 8, 14, 24, 31, 33, 42, 46, 48, and 49 U.S.C. (1976)); see S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7842, 7845 [hereinafter cited
as 1974 SENATE REPORT]. The Hill-Burton Act resulted from Congress's recognition of the
need to increase the capacity of the nation's health facilities. Id. at 39, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7878. The Depression, World War II, and the maldistribu-
tion of facilities among the states and between rural and urban areas were factors in pro-
ducing an overall shortage of hospital beds. Id. at 19, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 7859. To correct deficiencies in supply and allocation, the Hill-Burton Act
authorized federal grants to the states to survey state needs and develop state plans for
the construction of public and voluntary nonprofit hospitals and public health centers. Id.
By 1974, however, state plan data on the status of health facilities indicated that a surplus
of hospital beds existed in the nation. Id. at 24, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 7864. The need still exists, however, for the modernization of existing facilities
and for development of outpatient facilities. Id.
In 1966 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Ser-
vices Amendments (CHP) to coordiante and control health care delivery through state and
local planning agencies. See Pub. L. No. 89-749, 80 Stat. 1180 (1966) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 242g, 243, 246, and 247(a) (1976)). The CHP requires that the states provide and encourage
cooperative efforts among governmental or nongovernmental agencies in the fields of educa-
tion, welfare, and rehabilitation. 42 U.S.C. S 246(a) (2) (b) (1976). The general shortcomings
of the CHP that precipitated Congress' passage of the Planning Act were difficulties of
understaffing, underfunding, lack of planning direction, and lack of federal assistance and
monitoring. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra, at 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 7853.
9 See 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 39-40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 7878-79. The Senate Report emphasized the need for strengthened and coor-
dinated planning for consumer health services in view of the health care industry's lack
of response to traditional competitive marketplace principles. Id. at 39, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7878. The Senate Committee attributed the industry's
failure to control rising medical costs to the highly techinical nature of medical services
and the third-party payment system. Id. A contributory factor to the anticompetitive nature
of health care was the misallocation of health services and facilities, especially in the over-
supply of urban areas as opposed to rural communities. Id., supra note 8, at 39-40, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7879.
"I Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 5, at 3; Health Planning, supra note 1, at 314.
"1 Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 5, at 3-4; see infra notes 13-26 and accompanying
text (discussion of health care's departure from competitive ideals).
12 Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 5, at 3-4; see infra notes 27-29 and accompanying
text (rationale that health planning will help achieve governmental health policy goals).
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Underlying the rationale that the health care market deviates from
the competitive model is the fundamental assumption that consumers in
the health care market lack sufficient knowledge to make informed
judgments about health care services. 3 Thus, patients must delegate
decision-making authority to physicians who then are in a position to deter-
mine and control patient demand. 4 Another assumption underlying the
first rationale for health planning stems from the important role that non-
profit institutions play in the health care field." In the competitive market
system, the profit motive operates to encourage efficiency and low cost
production while eliminating institutions that become overly inefficient. 6
Nonprofit institutions, however, lack the profit motive necessary to achieve
greater efficiency or to adjust output in order to achieve higher profits."
3 Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 5, at 3-4; see infra note 14 (discussion of health care
consumer).
" Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 5, at 3-4; see Drake & Kozak, supra note 1, at 333-35.
Health care deviates from the model market in the area of "consumer sovereignty," the
consumer's ability to make decisions over what goods are sold and the price of goods sold.
Drake & Kozak, supra note 1, at 333. Consumers of health services often delegate their
consumer sovereignty to physicians because physicians have the knowledge and skills in
medical treatments that consumers lack. Id. Physicians, therefore, are in a position to allocate
services to each patient and to determine the costs of services rendered. Id. Because the
physician influences both supply and demand for health services, the health care industry
differs substantially from the market model where supply and demand forces exist in-
dependently of each other. Id.
Another factor emphasizing the uniqueness of the health care field is the relatively
minor role that price plays in health care transactions as opposed to traditional market
dealings. Id. The suspension of cost concerns in health situations occurs because the need
for health care services frequently is impossible to anticipate or postpone. Id. at 334. Also,
the pricing of services is difficult in a field in which the service offered is unique to each
individual depending upon the patient's age, severity of illness, and other factors. Id. Fur-
thermore, the emotional stress accompanying severe illnesses limits the individual's inclination
to compare prices for services. Id.; see also Rosoff, supra note 1, at 447 (demand for health
services frequently controlled by provider rather than by consumer).
"' Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 5, at 4. Voluntary nonprofit entities are the predominate
form of hospital organization, accounting for 70% of all nonfederal, short term general, and
other special hospital beds. Dimieri & Weiner, The Public Interest and Governing Boards
of Nonprofit Health Care Institutions, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1029, 1032 n.18 (1981).
16 Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 5, at 4.
,, Id.; see Clark, Does The Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARv L. REy.
1417, 1417-19 (1980). Among the criticisms of nonprofit health care institutions (nonprofits)
are the problems stemming from operational inefficiencies, arbitrariness in response to service
demands, and promotion of high technology medical care. Clark, supra at 1417-19. The cur-
rent subsidization of and favoritism for nonprofits serves only to perpetuate the problems
that nonprofits foster. Id. at 1418. To improve the situation, one proposal calls for a four-
part program. Id. at 1488. The first part of the program would subject both profit and
nonprofit institutions to the same legal standards, including property taxes. Id. The second
proposal advocates adoption of legal rules that promote consumers' control of nonprofit
hospitals. Id. The third part of the program proposes that payors to nonprofit hospitals
have the right to object to a hospital's below-marginal sale of services. Id. The final pro-
posal calls for legal reforms to promote informed consumer choice, including cost sharing
by patients and mandatory disclosure about key medical procedures. Id. See generally Dimieri
& Weiner, supra note 15, at 1033-63 (critique of nonprofit institutional system).
[Vol. 40:1505
ANTITRUST AND HEALTH PLANNING
Aggravating the incentive problem is the system of third-party payment
that characterizes present health insurance plans.18 Under the present
system, insurance companies reimburse physicians and hospitals for the
costs of health services.19 Consequently, only the third-party payor in-
surance companies have any incentive to control costs."0 Despite the ad-
"s Blumstein & Sloan, supra, note 5, at 4-5. Third-party payments presently dominate
the health care financing system, with private insurers paying approximately 27% of all
personal health care expenditures in 1978 and public entitlement programs paying approx-
imately 39% of all expenditures. Marmor, Boyer & Greenberg, Medical Care and Pro-
competitive Reform, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (1981). The structure of the third-party
system furnishes the health provider with incentives to push resources beyond national
limitatons, regardless of productivity and efficiency concerns. See Reilly & Lagge, supra
note 3, at 261. Because the third-party payor and the consumer are liable for costs incurred,
the reimbursement system involves minimal risks for provider inefficiency. Id. The reim-
bursement system therefore supports provider goals of supplying maximum care through
the most expensive services and expansions of facilities. Id.
19 See Kallstrom, Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors: Fee Schedules and
the Sherman Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 645, 647 (1978). Under the customary reimbursement prac-
tice, doctors and hospitals submit bills for insurance companies to pay. Id. The reimburse-
ment system thus offers little incentive for economic restraint since doctors know that
the insurance company will pay for services rendered and patients, who pay only insurance
policy premiums, feel that all care is essentially free. Id.
I Id. at 648. Several reasons exist why a third-party payor might want to impose price
ceilings on providers. Id. at 648 n.9. One reason is that control of medical costs could reverse
the problem of financial loss that many health insurance plans have experienced for a number
of years. Id. Another reason is that an insurer who attempts to be cost effective could
expect to capture a large segment of the health insurance market by reducing the price
of the insurance coverages to consumers below the competitors' prices. Id. Furthermore,
an efficient cost control program would remove the pressure caused by health care infla-
tion from the insurance industry and place the burden on hospitals and doctors, who are
in a better position to prevent cost increases. Id. Finally, an insurer cost control program
would make medical insurance plans more consistent with the standard insurance practice
of seeking to restrict payments. Id.
Fee schedules that limit what providers of health care may charge for services often
come within the Sherman Act's ban on price-fixing. Id. at 654; see infra text accompanying
notes 72-77 (discussion of per se unlawful restraints under Sherman Act, including price
fixing). The Supreme Court recently decided a case involving efforts to contain health costs
through the setting of maximum fees. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y., 457
U.S. 332 (1982). In Maricopa, the state of Arizona filed suit against two foundations for
medical care (FMCs) and the county medical society associated with the foundations, challeng-
ing the FMCs agreement to fix the maximum fees that physicians may claim for services
to insureds of FMC-approved insurance plans. Id. at 33942. The State of Arizona contended
that the defendants engaged in illegal price fixing conspiracies because the upward revi-
sions of the maximum fee schedules effectively stabilized the level of actual charges by
physicians and, in addition, increased insurance premiums. Id. at 341-42. The foundations
argued that the schedules operated to limit physicians' fees and to aid insurance companies
in calculating more efficiently the risks the companies underwrote, thereby serving as an
effective cost containment mechanism. Id. at 342. The Supreme Court held that the max-
imum fee agreements, as price fixing agreements, were per se unlawful under the Sherman
Act. Id. at 346-48. By fixing maximum prices, the challenged agreements tended to provide
the same economic rewards to all physicians regardless of skill or training. Id. at 348. The
agreement also potentially discouraged entry into the market and deterred experimenta-
tion and new developments by individual entrepreneurs. Id. The Court found nothing in
the nature of the medical profession or the health care industry that warranted the schedule's
19831 1509
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vantages in holding charges down, the response of commercial insurers
to health care inflation has been to increase premiums.2
Third-party payment schemes, nonprofit institutions, and un-
sophisticated consumers do not constitute all the factors underlying the
proposition that the health market is inherently noncompetitive.' The final
factor that supports an argument for health planning is the existence of
the traditional physician-hospital relationship." A hospital's major source
of patients is a roster of physicians with staff privileges.24 Because physi-
cians receive training to be clinical scientists as well as practitioners, a
well-equipped hospital is essential to allow physicians to practice what
the medical schools teach.'5 Hospitials therefore will vie for physicians
by accommodating the physicians' requests for specialized equipment,
which the hospitals often cannot justify acquiring under utilization
projections."
Underlying the rationale that health planning can aid in achieving
governmental health policy goals is the argument that competitive market
techniques cannot cure defects in the health care system.' Without a
national planning scheme, planning proponents contend that the medical
marketplace would promote inefficiency, permit cost increases, and fail to
curtail unnecessary duplication.' Proponents of health planning also argue
exemption from the per se rules against price-fixing. Id. at 348. See generally Shapiro, Cost
Containment in the Health Care Field and the Antitrust Laws, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 425, 428-35
(1982) (discussion of cost containment efforts and Maricopa case).
2, Kallstrom, supra note 19, at 648.
See infra text accompanying notes 23-26 (discussion of physician-hospital assumption).
Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 5, at 5.
24 Id.
Reilly & Legge, supra note 3, at 261-62.
' Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 5, at 5; see Reilly & Legge, supra note 3, at 261-62.
In addition to clinically trained physicians, a number of other incentives prompt hospitals
to add services. Reilly & Legge, supra note 3, at 261-62. One influence on resource con-
sumption by the hospital is the definition of quality medical care that encompasses the
notions of high technology and equipment, quantity of services, teaching, and research. Id.
Under the influence of the definition of quality medical care, the medical profession rates
community hospitals according to the degree of specialization and technological advance-
ment, with large metropolitan teaching hospitals near the top of the ladder. Id. Small hospitals,
thus, have incentives to add services and to provide more complex technology on site. Id.
Critics of the present state of the hospital care system suggest modification of public
policies regarding medical manpower. See id. at 263-64. One area of policy reform involves
withdrawing operational and research support from regional residency training centers to
control the number of physicians and the increase of medical specialities. Id. at 264. Another
policy reform is to allocate financial support in favor of medical schools and centers whose
priorities concern the public interest and needs. Id. A third reform suggests that public
entities designate which hopsitals should perform specified levels of specialized services,
on a reimbursement basis. Id. The final reform proposes to restructure educational loans
to require public service commitments to state and local public health care agencies in order
to ensure effective distribution of access to health care. Id.
I7 Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 5, at 6; see also Conflict, supra note 5, at 598 (citing
Blumstein & Sloan).
I Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 5, at 6; see Bovbjerg, supra note 1, at 967. Many
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that planning will rectify the unequal distribution of health services and
achieve greater equality of access to medical facilities.29
To achieve the major goals of health planning advocates and to remedy
a number of deficiencies in earlier health planning laws, including the
absence of planning procedures and the failure to define goals for suc-
cess, Congress enacted the Planning Act in 1974.1o The Planning Act cor-
rects prior defects by establishing detailed processes and procedures for
planning at federal, state, and local levels." At the federal level, the Plan-
ning Act requires the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services to establish guidelines concerning national health planning policy.
Section 501(b) of the Planning Act states that guidelines must include stan-
dards regarding the appropriate supply, distribution, and organization of
health resources, as well as a statement of national health planning goals.3
At the local level, the Planning Act requires the establishment of
Health Services Areas that define a geographic region for the planning
and development of health services.' Within each area, a network of Health
Systems Agencies (HSAs) contracts with the federal government to fulfill
noncompetitive elements of medical care appear to be inherent in the fundamental nature
of the industry. Id. The most important element that makes medical care intrinsically dif-
ferent from other economic activities is that providers, including physicians and hospitals,
eliminate resource allocation decisions in medicine. Id. Because providing medical care is
a very technical field of which consumers largely are ignorant, consumer sovereignty over
the kind of quality of care desired is difficult to exercise. Id. But see Health Planning, supra
note 1, at 336-37. One commentator, however, rejects the conclusion that the health industry
is a separate economic structure, existing outside the reach of market influences and an-
titrust laws. Id. at 336. Because health planning through CON enforcement fails to ensure
that necessary services are available, the justifications for anticompetitive conduct in plan-
ning activities have little validity. Id.; see infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (CON
is enforcement mechanism of Planning Act which state law requires medical facilities to
obtain before making capital expenditures on health care projects); infra text accompany-
ing notes 169-75 (criticisms of CON legislation). The commentator advocates increased en-
forcement of medical antitrust actions, with stricter limitations on the application of an-
titrust exemptions in the health care area. Health Planning, supra note 1, at 330-37.
Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 5, at 6.
See id. at 8. In addition to the absence of planning procedures and the failure to
define goals, previous health planning laws failed to grant sufficient planning powers to
planning agencies, failed to provide an adequate professional staff, and depended excessively
on local sources of funding. Id. For example, the CHP had little authority beyond commen-
ting on and recommending uses for federal funds. Id. at 8 n.36; see supra note 8 (discussing
CHP); see also 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 5-35 (discussion of previous planning
legislation), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7846-82.
3' See 42 U.S.C. §5 300k-n (1976); infra notes 32-48 and accompanying text (discussion
of Planning Act provisions).
42 U.S.C. § 300k-1(a) (1976).
- Id. § 300k-1(b)(1-(2). Section 1501 of the Planning Act requires the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services to consult with and solicit recommendations
from agencies and councils set up under the Planning Act, as well as from societies represen-
ting health care providers. Id. § 300k-1(c).
- Id. S 3001. In establishing the boundaries of the Health Service Areas, the Secretary
must consult with the governor of each state. Id. S 3001(b) (a) (C). The designation of the
boundaries then are subject to continuing review by the Secretary. Id. S 3001(b) (3) (B) (i)(4).
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planning and development functions." The HSAs serve five major pur-
poses under the Planning Act. 6 The purposes include improving the ac-
cessibility and quality of health services, restraining health care costs,
preventing unnecessary duplication of health resources, and preserving
and improving competition in the health services area.17 The Planning Act
also requires that HSAs develop a health systems plan that includes a
detailed statement of goals established in accordance with national
guidelines for health planning policy. 8 In addition, the Planning Act re-
quires that the HSAs devise, review, and amend an Annual Implementa-
tion Plan, which identifies priorities and establishes objectives required
to achieve the goals of the health systems plan. 9
The Planning Act accomplishes coordination between local and state
planning activities by establishing a state health planning and develop-
ment agency.that devises a preliminary state health plan in accordance
with the health system plans developed by the local HSAs.10 The state
agency must review periodicially all the institutional health services that
the state offers and make public any findings.3 The state agency also must
submit to the local HSAs a detailed account of the reasons for any incon-
sistencies between actions taken by the agency and the goals of the health
systems plan prepared by the HSA.
In addition to the state agencies, the Planning Act also establishes
an advisory Statewide Health Coordinating Council which prepares,
reviews, and revises a state health plan.43 Interested parties may submit
oral or written comments regarding the plan at specified public hearings."
Id. S 3001-1. A Health Service Agency (HSA) may be organized as a nonprofit private
corporation, a public regional planning body, or a single unit of general local government.
Id. § 3001-1(b) (1). To qualify as an HSA, a nonprofit private corporation must exist as an
independent entity, incorporated in the state in which the largest part of the population
of the health service area resides. Id. S 3001-1(b) (1) (A). A public regional planning body,
in order to qualify for designation, must have a governing body composed of a majority
of elected officials of units of general local government or must receive state authorization
to carry out health planning and review functions required of HSAs. Id. § 3001-1(b) (1) (B).
Finally, a single unit of general local government receives HSA status if the unit's area
of jurisidiction is identical to the health service area. Id. § 3001-1(b) (1) (C).
- Id. S 3001-2(1)45) (1976 & Supp. V. 1981); see infra text accompanying note 37 (five
purposes of HSAs).
42 U.S.C. § 3001-2(1)-(5).
Id. 5 3001-2(b) (2).
39 Id. 5 3001-2(b) (3).
,0 Id. 5 300m-2(a) (2).
Id. S 300m-2(a) (6).
,2 Id. S 300m-2(c).
11 Id. 5 300m-3(c) (2) (A). The state health plan must consist of the health systems plans
of the HSAs within the state. Id.
" Id.§ 300m-3(c) (2) (B). The Planning Act requires that agency officials issue an-
nouncements of public hearings giving the terms and place of the hearings at least 30 days
in advance and in at least two newspapers of general circulation in the state. Id.
[Vol. 40:1505
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The state council also reports to the Secreatary of the Department of
Health and Human Services on the health system and annual implemen-
tation plans of each HSA within the state."
In 1979, Congress amended the Planning Act with the Health Plann-
ing and Resources Development Amendments of 197946 (1979 Amendments).
One purpose of the 1979 Amendments was to direct the health planning
process toward maintaining and improving competition in the health
industry."' To achieve the planning goal, Congress amended a number of
the Planning Act's provisions to require promotion of competition at local,
state, and federal levels. 8
To enforce the health planning scheme, the Planning Act employs a
mechanism known as a certificate of need or CON.49 A CON is a license
5 300m-3(c) (6).
46 Pub. L. No. 96-79,93 Stat. 592 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976
& & Supp. V 1981) (1979 Amendments).
'7 S. REP.No. 96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws
1306, 1308 [hereinafter cited as 1979 SENATE REPORT] The House Report on the 1979 Amend-
ments clarified the role of competition in the health planning scheme. See H. R. REP. No.
190, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 51-54 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 HOUSE REPORT]. Recogniz-
ing the distortion of market forces for institution health services, the House Committee
cited third-party reimbursement arrangements, high technology and the physician-patient
relationship as the major contributors to the misallocation of health services. Id. at 51-52.
The Committee also stated that the integration of competitive considerations is possible
in health planning activities. Id. at 52. To facilitate competition, the Committee advocated
evaluation of competitive factors by HSAs in conducting CON review. Id. at 52-53; see infra
notes 49-53 and accompanying text (CON is license required by state before medical facilities
can make capital expenditures on health care projects). A proper evaluation would entail
the consideration of whether the effect of the new arrangement would operate to allocate
the appropriate supply in response to consumer demand. 1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra, at
53. For health care services that do not operate on an effective market basis, the planning
agencies would use the CON process to restrain increases in the cost of health services
and prevent unnecessary duplication of health resources. Id.
The House Committee also considered the application of the antitrust laws to planning
activities. See id. at 54-56. The Committee proposed the aggressive enforcement of antitrust
laws to ensure a competitive economy in health care areas that respond to competition
on the basis of price, quality, and service. Id. at 54. The Committee limited the antitrust
initiative, however, by finding immunity from antitrust enforcement for planning agencies
that carry out specific functions within the authority of the Planning Act. Id. at 54-55. Ap-
propriate functions for agencies acting under the Planning Act include developing health
plans, making review findings and recommendations and issuing CONs in appropriate cir-
cumstances. Id. at 55.
" See 42 U.S.C. 5 300k-2 (1976), amended by 42 U.S.C. S 300k-2 (b)(3) (Supp. V 1981)
(planning agencies should advance competition for health services in which competition ap-
propriately allocates supply, id. S 3001-2, amended by 42 U.S.C. S 300k-2(a)(5)(1976) (one pur-
pose of HSA is to preserve and improve competition in health service area). See generally
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 420, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1422, 1425-26 (conference compromise on role of competition in health planning).
" See Conflict, supra note 5, at 599-600 (CON gives "teeth" to Planning Act's enforce-
ment procedures).
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required by a state before medical facilities can make capital expenditures
on health care projects.50 The rationale behind CON is twofold.51 First,
by limiting health care services to only necessary items, CON laws will
keep medical costs low.52 Second, CON will serve the public interest by
allocating services to meet the needs of the area's population.'
As a result of CON laws, any health care institution seeking to ex-
pand facilities, change services offered, make major purchases, or enter
the marketplace must obtain a CON from the state by documenting that
a need for the proposed service exists.' The institution submits the
documentation of need to either a state reviewing agency or the HSA
for approval. 55 The Planning Act provides that states that fail to designate
agencies to perform CON review cannot receive federal funds for develop-
ment, expansion, or support of health resources. 6 CON, as the regulatory
mechanism of the Planning Act, represents Congress' determination to
control supply of health resources in light of the inefficiencies and ine-
quities produced by the health industry's lack of response to marketplace
forces.57 Through the control of supply, CON legislation grants significant
-o Id. at 600. CON laws first appeared in New York in 1964, primarily to aid in health
cost containment. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2802 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1982) (ap-
plication for construction of hospital required from state). Campaigns for CON laws spread
throughout the states in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note
5, at 19. The first federal recognition of CON occurred in the Social Security Amendments
of 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(1976); see D. ABERNETHY & D. PEARSON, REGULATING HOSPITAL COSTS: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF PUBLIC POLICY 63 (1979) (government recognized CON concept through enactment of Sec-
tion 1122 of Social Security Amendments). Section 1122 of the 1972 Amendments required
the Secretary of HEW to enter into agreements with states willing to review the need
for proposed capital expenditures. 42 U.S.C. S 1320a-l(b) (1976). In states that performed
CON review, facilities making capital expenditures without state agency approval lost federal
reimbursement for depreciation, interest, and return on equity. Id. S 1320a-l(d)(1).
Generally, CON laws involve state regulation of the building, expansion, and moder-
nization of health care facilities and of the capital equipment of health care providers. See
Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 5, at 19. CON's are reactionary in the sense that the process
relies primarily on an institution's initiative in proposing a change in beds, facilities, or
other services. Id. at 19-20. Actions by CON agencies to initiate capital projects in underserved
areas, however, are rare. Id. at 20. See generally Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities
and Services by "Certificate of Need, " 59 VA. L. REV. 1143, 1150-55 (1973); Schonbrun, Mak-
ing Certificate of Need Work, 57 N.C.L. REV. 1259, 1263-66 (1979) (discussion of CON laws).
1, See Health Planning, supra note 1, at 311 (discussion of CON ability to lower medical
costs).
Id. at 311; see infra notes 169-75 (criticisms of CON ability to allocate resources
effectively).
Health Planning, supra note 1, at 311.
" Schonbrun, supra note 50, at 1264.
42 U.S.C. §§ 300m(d), 300m-2(a}(4)(B) (1976). The effect of the federal CON statutes
has been the enactment of CON laws in every state except Louisiana as of early 1983. 1lA
HOPSITAL LAW MANUAL (Health L. Center) 1-5 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
, See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300k-2 (1976) (congressional findings and national health goals
set forth in Planning Act); Miller, Antitrust and Certificate of Need: Health Systems Agen-
cies, the Planning Act, and Regulatory Capture, 68 GEo. L.J. 873, 874 (1980) (CON represents
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market power to the regulatory body that oversees CON applications.'
CON, consequently, permits monopoly by barring entry and limiting ex-
pansion in the health market. 9 Health planning through CON also requires
health care providers, agencies, and competing institutuions to participate
in the planning process."0 Although Congress viewed industry participa-
tion as important to any health care system,6' potential remains for
industry control of the planning process 2 Consequently, certain elements
of health planning are subject to attack under antitrust laws as being either
monopolies or conspiracies in restraint of trade.
Charges that the health industry controls elements of the planning
process through illegal restraints or monopolies in restraint of trade are
subject to legal scrutiny under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act."
government's determination to confront overutilization problem in light of industry's in-
ability to ration services on its own).
I See Rosoff, supra note 1, at 448 (CON contributes to regulatory capture of health
industry by health providers); Health Planning, supra note 1, at 312 (CON operates to grant
market power through limiting investment in equipment and capital improvements only
to institutions that receive CON approval).
' Health Planning, supra note 1, at 312.
'o See U.S.C. 5 3001-1(b)(3)(C) (1976 & Supp. V. 1981) The Planning Act encourages health
providers to determine whether need exists for other providers' proposals by requiring
that providers constitute at least 40% but no more than 49% of the membership of each
HSA governing body. See id. at S 3001-1(bX3l(C). The term "provider" includes health care
professionals, institutions, and insurers, as well as fiduciaries of health care institutions,
persons receiving 10% of their gross annual income from health-related sources, and im-
mediate family members of providers. Id. S 300n(3). Congress deliberately defined health
care provider. See 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 46 (intent of definition is to in-
clude any individual with existing or potential conflict of interest regarding recommenda-
tions of health planning agency), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS at 7885.
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 300k(a(5) (1976). Congress noted that the health care provider is
one of the most important participants in any health care system. Id. Health policy, therefore,
must address the legitimate needs and concerns of the provider to achieve meaningful results.
Id. Congress, therefore, stated that at all costs the provider should play an active role in
developing health policy. Id.
62 See Miller, supra note 57, at 879-888. The potential for regulatory capture of the
planning process exists because the Planning Act permits health providers to help deter-
mine whether need exists for other providers' proposals. Id. at 879; see supra note 60 (Plan-
ning Act requires that providers constitute at least 40% of membership of each HSA). While
consumers also must participate in the planning process, the economic incentive to engage
in anticompetitive behavior does not exist to the same degree as the incentives for pro-
viders. Miller, supra note 57, at 880; see 42 U.S.C. S 3001-1(b)(3)(C) (1976) (majority of members
of HSA must be individuals representing area's economic, social, linguistic, and racial popula-
tions); infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text (criticisms of CON).
' See infra notes 101-62 and accompanying text (discussion of antitrust actions brought
because of health planning activities).
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The sources of antitrust scrutiny vary.
See Horan & Nord, supra note 1, at 715-18. Governmental enforcement agencies presently
instigate a preponderance of medical antitrust actions. Id. at 715. The preeminent federal
antitrust agency studying the medical market is the FTC. Marmor, Boyer & Greenberg,
supra note 18, at 1022; see supra note 7 (discussion of FTC and Federal Trade Commission
Act). Along with the FTC, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is active
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Under the broad language of section 1, any contract or conspiracy in
restraint of trade is illegal." Section 2 provides that any person who
attempts to monopolize or conspire with others to monopolize is guilty
of a felony. Because a literal interpretation of section 1 would invalidate
every contract or restraint necessary for the transaction of business,67
courts interpreting section 1 have employed a "rule of reason" approach
in determining that the Act applies only to unreasonable restraints of
trade. 8 In Standard Oil Co. v. United States,69 the Supreme Court first
announced the rule of reason in holding that the Sherman Act forbids
only conduct that unduly interferes with freely competitive markets."
in prosecuting traditional antitrust violations such as price fixing, group boycotts, and tying
arrangements. Horan & Nord, supra note 1, at 15-16. Professionals presently bring most
private suits, normally alleging some competitive disadvantages resulting from nonrecognition
by the health care system. See, e.g., Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d
286, 287 (5th Cir. 1982) (action by anesthesiologist charging illegal tying arrangement with
respect to application for admission to hospital medical staff); Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-
Cabrini Med. Center, 684 F.2d 1346, 1348 (7th Cir. 1982) (action by anesthesiologist charging
illegal exclusive dealing agreement for provision of anesthesia services at hospital); McElhin-
ney v. Medical Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121, 124-25 (E.D. Ky. 1982) (action by surgeon
charging illegal group boycott by hospital staff in denial of hospital privileges).
In addition to private suits, the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 authorizes state
attorneys general, in their parens patriae capacity, to institute civil antitrust suits on behalf
of individuals residing in the state. See Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15, 18, & 28 U.S.C. (1976)) (Antitrust Improvements Act). The parens patriae
suit thereby provides a mechanism for classwide relief while avoiding the difficulties in-
volved in satisfying the requirements for class relief under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Horan & Nord, supra note 1, at 716-17; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (class action provi-
sion). Upon a finding of antitrust liability, the state may seek injunctive relief. See Burch
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 633, 634 (4th Cir. 1977) (state attorney general
has standing to sue for injunctive relief in antitrust suit filed in parens patriae capacity).
The state also may recover treble damages for injury to the state's citizens, plus litigation
costs and attorneys fees. 15 U.S.C. 5 15c(d}(2) (1976). The court has discretion to require
that the state either distribute the recovery to the injured individuals or retain the recovery
as general state revenues. Id. 5 15e.
15 U.S.C. S 1 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
-Id. S 2.
"Thompson, Health Planning and Antitrust Exemptions: New Developments, 2 WHITT.
L. RE V. 649, 650 (1980) [hereinafter cited as New Developments]; see infra note 70 (language
of Sherman Act gives standard by which courts may measure the challenged restraint's
impact on competitive conditions).
See Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1981) (restraint
imposed by distributor of televisions on dealer is vertical restraint and therefore tested
under the rule of reason); Tose v. First Pennsylvania Bank, 648 F.2d 879, 891 (3d Cir.) (bank
attempt to force distress sale analyzed for violation of antitrust laws under rule of reason),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981).
221 U.S. 1 (1911).
70 Id. at 63-64. The Standard Oil Court stated that Congress did not intend a literal
application of the Sherman Act to every contract and agreement. Id. Rather, the Court
concluded from the generic use of terms in the Sherman Act and the lack of a definition
of restraint of trade that Congress designed the Sherman Act to fix a standard, leaving
courts to determine by the rule of reason whether any particular act or contract was within
the statute's scope. Id. at 64.
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Under the rule of reason approach, courts consider economic evidence
about the industry to determine whether a restrictive agreement unduly
hampers competition.7 1 Beginning with Standard Oil, however, the
Supreme Court has declared that the lower courts conclusively may
presume certain agreements to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without the need for supporting economic analysis.Y A "per se" violation
of the Sherman Act thus arises when the challenged restraints are so
inherently anticompetitive and lacking in redeeming virtue that the courts
may delare the practices unreasonable as a matter of law.73 The Supreme
Court has listed among the practices deemed per se unlawful price fixing,74
division of markets,75 group boycotts,
76 and tying arrangements. 7
The primary defenses against antitrust prosecution available to per-
sons involved in health planning activities are immunities created implicitly
by judicial interpretations of antitrust laws.78 The basic exemptions con-
' See National Soc'y of Prof. Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (analysis
under rule of reason entails determination of facts peculiar to business, history of restraint,
and reasons imposed); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 5, 606-07 (1972) (rule
of reason adopted in lieu of narrow reading of S 1 of Sherman Act); Board of Trade of City
of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (true test of legality under rule of
reason is whether restraint promotes or suppresses competition); see also Bork, The Rule
of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 375-76
(1966) (rule of reason only invalidates restraints with anticompetitive results that exceed
desirable effects, such as increased efficiency or availability of goods).
71 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1911). The Supreme Court
in Standard Oil ruled that the effect and character of some acts clearly are restraints of
trade, thereby creating a conclusive presumption of illegality under the Sherman Act. Id.
at 65; see also Mendelovitz v. Adolph Coors Co., 693 F.2d 570, 576-77 (5th Cir. 1982) (courts
conclusively presume restraints exhibiting deleterious effect on competition as per se illegal).
" Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The Northern Pacific
Court noted that the per se rule avoids the necessity for complicated and prolonged economic
investigations into the entire history of an industry, as well as related industries. Id. Under
the per se rule, once courts recognize that a particular practice is a per se violation, the
plaintiff government only need prove the existence of the practice to obtain a judgment
and thereby preclude the defendant from introducing evidence to justify the practices. Com-
ment, Horizontal Territorial Restraints and the Per Se Rule, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 457,
460 (1971); see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979) reh'g denied 450 U.S. 1050 (1979). In Broadcast Music, the court declared that the
focus of judicial inquiry under the per se rule is on whether the effect of the practice threatens
the proper operation of the free market economy by restricting competition or decreasing
output. Id.
7' See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221, 223 (1940) (any com-
bination formed for purpose of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing price of
commodity in interstate of foreign commerce is illegal per se).
" See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (market division
per se illegal).
"' See Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959) (group boycott
not tolerated just because victim is small business with little economic impact on market).
" Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (tying arrangements
that condition sale of one product on purchase of another are illegal per se when party
restrains free competition in market for tied product).
11 M. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 19. A number of regulated industries can avoid the
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stitute three general types.79 The first type of antitrust exemption, known
as the "implied repeal doctrine," states that courts can repeal the antitrust
laws by implication when a clear repugnancy exists between the regulatory
scheme and the antitrust law, but only to the minimum extent necessary
to allow the regulatory scheme to operate.' Overshadowing the implied
repeal doctrine is the Supreme Court's caveat in United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank that courts do not favor immunity from anti-
trust laws and, therefore, courts should not imply antitrust immunity
lightly."'
A second exemption available to the health care industry is the "state
action doctrine," which exempts from antitrust liability practices compelled
by the state through direct action of the state's executive, legislative, or
judicial branches.' In Bates v. State Bar of Arizonal the Supreme Court
emphasized the requirements that distinguish state actions that will im-
munize conduct from antitrust attack." One requirement the Bates Court
noted is that a clearly defined state policy must exist that compels the
practice in question."' Another requirement is that the state actively super-
standard application of the antitrust laws if the industry falls within an express or implied
statutory exemption. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 743 § 239 (1977).
Regulated industries that are exempt from antitrust laws include utilities, rail, banking,
and communication industries. Id. at 744; see United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.,
418 U.S. 602, 627 (1974) (antitrust standards must take into account federal and state
regulatory restraints on banking); Utility Users League v. Federal Power Comm'n, 394 F.2d
16, 21 (7th Cir.) (merger of electric and gas company not violation of antitrust laws since
State Commissioner considered public interest), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 953 (1968). Antitrust
exemptions created in the Planning Act provide limited immunity for members and employees
of specific public agencies. See 42 U.S.C. S 3001-1(b)(4) (1976). In addition, S 300-1(b)(4) pro-
vides a limited immunity only for members and employees of health service agencies. Id.
"' New Developments, supra note 67, at 650-51; see infra notes 80-99 and accompanying
text (discussion of antitrust exemptions).
"New Developments, supra note 67, at 650-51; see Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange,
422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975) (implied antitrust immunity justified only by showing of clear
repugnancy between antitrust laws and regulatory system); Silver v. New York Stock Exch.,
373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (implied repeal permissible only if necessary to make regulatory
scheme operate and then only to minimum extent necessary).
", See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963) (courts do
not favor immunity from antitrust laws. See also National Gerimedical Hosp. and Geron-
tology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388 (1981) (same); United States v. First City
Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967) (same).
See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975) reh'g denied 423 U.S.
886, (1975). In Goldfarb, the Supreme Court held that the threshold inquiry in determining
whether certain conduct qualifies for a state action exemption is whether the state as
sovereign actually requires the conduct. Id.; New Developments, supra note 67, at 651 (state
action doctrine may protect certain conduct compelled by the state); see also Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (Sherman Act applies to individual and not to state action).
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vise the practice." In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has ap-
plied the state action exemption narrowly." In Cantor & Seldon Drugs
Co. v. Detroit Edison Co.,' for example, the Court held that when the
regulated party causes the state to adopt an anticompetitive rule, the rule
does not suffice to confer the state action exemption. 9 The Court also
held in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co." that lesser
governmental entities, including municipalities, do not enjoy automatic
antitrust immunity and cannot confer a state action exemption unless the
execution of the challenged conduct is pursuant to a state regulation
policy.,'
In addition to the implied repeal doctrine and the state action doc-
trine, the Supreme Court has recognized another exemption involving the
anticompetitive effects of government activity.2 The exemption, known
Id. at 362; see Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
In Community Communications, a cable television operator sued the city of Boulder, alleg-
ing that an ordinance prohibiting him from expanding business for three months while the
city council drafted a model cable ordinance and invited new businesses to enter the market
violated the Sherman Act. 455 U.S. at 43-46. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance
was not exempt under the state action theory since the city acted without any regulation
by the state. Id. at 54-56.
7 See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412-13 (1978)
(municipalities do not enjoy automatic antitrust immunity); Cantor & Seldon Drugs Co. v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 596-98 (1976) (activity merely permitted and not part of
conscious policy of state does not confer automatic antitrust immunity).
428 U.S 579 (1976).
Id. at 582-83, 597-98. In Cantor, the plaintiff, a retail druggist selling light bulbs,
claimed that the defendant utility company used its monopoly power in the distribution
of electricity to restrain competition. Id. at 581. The company, a private utility that was
the sole supplier of electricity for the area, also furnished residential customers with free
standard-sized light bulbs under a practice antedating the state's regulation of electric utilities.
Id. at 582-84. After the state began regulation of electric utilities in 1909, the state implicit-
ly approved of the defendant's light bulb program. Id. at 583. The defendants alleged that
the purpose of the program was to increase consumption of electricity in the area. Id. at
584. The plaintiff claimed, however, that the effect of the program was to prevent competi-
tion in a substantial segment of the light bulb market. Id. The Court refused to apply the
state action exemption to the utility's practice, finding that the state's implicit approval
of the light bulb program did not implement any state policy relating to light bulbs. Id.
at 597-98. The Court inferred, therefore, that the state's policy was neutral on the question
of whether a utility should operate the type of program challenged in Cantor. Id.
435 U.S. 389 (1978).
91 Id. at 412-13. The Lafayette Court noted that to extend the state action doctrine
to municipalities would be inconsistent with the doctrine. Id. The court speculated that
serious economic dislocation could result if cities were free to place municipal interests
above the nation's economic-goals in antitrust laws. Id
' See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972)
(antitrust immunity extends to cover concerted efforts before adjudicatory bodies based
on first amendment right to petition government); United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (joint effort to influence public officials does not violate antitrust
laws even though intended to eliminate competition); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference
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as the "Noerr-Pennington doctrine,"93 protects attempts by private par-
ties to influence governmental units and instrumentalities in order to
obtain legislation, redress, or action favorable to particular interests, even
if the parties intend the efforts at persuasion to produce or actually result
in an anticompetitive effect.94 The Supreme Court views the attempts at
persuasion as falling within the protections offered by the first amend-
ment right to speak freely and to petition the government.95 A basic ex-
ception to the first amendment privilege exists, however, when conduct
that apparently seeks to influence government action actually is a sham
to cover an attempt to interfere directly with the operations of a
competitor." Furthermore, the exemption fails to operate if the parties
endeavor to influence a public official who actually is a coconspirator in
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138-39 (1961) (concerted effort to influence legisla-
tion not invalid under Sherman Act simply because of anticompetitive effect).
11 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
128-39 (1961). Noerr was the first case exempting from the Sherman Act joint activities
aimed at achieving anticompetitive governmental decisions. Id. In Noerr, several railroads
lobbied state legislators and the governor in an effort to influence legislation that would
eliminate trucking companies as competitors in the long distance heavy freight business.
Id. at 142-43. The railroads' publicity campaign used front organizations that sent letters
to government officials making public sentiment appear to be against the truckers. Id. at
133. The railroads succeeded in obtaining the desired legislation and the trucking companies
brought an antitrust suit based on the railroads' anticompetitive purpose and fraudulent
publicity campaign. Id. at 129-30. The Supreme Court held that the railroads' activities did
not violate the Sherman Act for two reasons. Id. at 137-38. First, the Sherman Act regulated
monopolistic business practices and not political behavior. Id. Second, the case would raise
important first amendment issues regarding the right to petition the government if the
Court held that the Sherman Act covered the railroads' lobbying activities. Id. The Court
issued a caveat to the antitrust exemption policy, stating that the court may refuse to grant
antitrust immunity if the challenged activities were a mere sham to cover an attempt to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor. Id. at 144.
In United States Workers v. Pennington, the Court again faced the question of antitrust
immunity for joint efforts directed at government officials. See 381 U.S. 657, 65-60 (1965).
In Pennington, large mine owners and the mine worker's union lobbied with the Secretary
of Labor to persuade the Secretary to use his authority to set higher wages for employees
of firms selling coal to the TVA, in order to force the smaller operators out of business.
Id. at 660. The group also urged the TVA to reduce its purchases of coal from small coal
operators in the market. Id. at 660-61. The Supreme Court held that the activities of the
mine owners and the union were immune from the antitrust laws. Id. at 670. The Court
also extended the Noerr principle in stating that joint efforts to influence "public officials"
do not violate the antitrust laws even through intended to eliminate competition. Id.
, See supra note 93 (discussion of Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
9 See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972)
(recognizing constitutional right to petition government as exempting some concerted efforts
to influence government action).
" See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
144 (1961) (antitrust immunity denied if activity is direct attempt to interfere with com-
petitor's business); see also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973)
(repetitive litigation and insubstantial claims that abuse jddicial process are within sham
exception to Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
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some other capacity.' The Noerr-Pennington doctrine arises frequently
in antitrust ligiation in the health care field because professional groups
regularly lobby state and federal governments in an attempt to influence
legislation and regulatory action.98 If the legislature or appropriate ad-
ministrative agency approves the proposed action, the resulting law may
restrict competition and thereby be subject to scrutiny under the antitrust
laws."9
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, as well as the state action and im-
plied repeal antitrust exemptions, have been the subject of several cases
challenging the anticompetitive consequences of health planning."' In
National Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of
Kansas City,'° the Supreme Court considered for the first time the issue
of implied immunity from the Sherman Act based on the Planning Act.
1' 2
Petitioner National Gerimedical Hospital (National) was a private hospital
erected in 1978 in metropolitan Kansas City.10 3 One year prior to comple-
' United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670-71 (1965); see Duke & Co.
v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1975). In Duke a manufacture and seller of malt
beverages claimed that three municipal corporations, three private corporations, and a county
commissioner conspired to boycott the plaintiff's product. The Third Circuit sustained the
allegations, relying on the fact that both Noerr and Pennington involved suits against private
parties and not against the government entity in promoting the conspiracy. Id. at 1282.
05 See Feminist Women's Medical Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 538-39 (5th
Cir. 1978). In Mohammad, the Fifth Circuit held the Noerr-Pennington defense inapplicable
to certain attempts by a group of physicians to block the operation of an abortion center.
Id. at 542. The attempts consisted mainly of complaints to the state board of medical ex-
aminers, the local medical society, and the organized medical staffs of two hospitals that
the center's facilities were inadequate for back-up medical services. I& at 536-38. The Court
found that only the communications addressed to the medical examiners were exempt under
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Id. at 542-43; see also Rosoff, supra note 1, at 471. Profes-
sional groups that attempt to influence health care legislation include physicians who lobby
state legislatures to adopt or retain laws that exclude less qualified physicians from engag-
ing in specialized health care activities. Id. Professional organizations also may lobby Con-
gress to certify only persons with specified qualifications as competent to render certain
types of care under Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health programs. Id.
" See Rosoff, supra note 1, at 471-72. The policy issue in considering whether propos-
ed standards violate the antitrust law is what balance between competition and the
maintenance of quality by passage of standards best serves the public interest. Id.
10 See National Gerimedical Hosp. and Geronotology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas
City, 452 U.S. 378, 392-93 (1981) (Planning Act does not create blanket repeal of antitrust
laws in health planning area); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678,
685 (4th Cir. 1982) (modified per se rule applicable to antitrust analysis of planning activities
of health providers); Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Connecticut, Inc., 675 F.2d 502,505-06 (1982) (Blue Cross pharmacy agreements are novel
restraints subject to judicial analysis under rule of reason); Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v.
City of Pontiac, 666 F.2d 1029, 1032 (6th Cir. 1981) (no implied immunity for planning activi-
ty involving refusal to issue CON for hospital construction).
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tion, National applied to Blue Cross for a participating contract, which
would enable the hospital to receive reimbursement directly from the Blue
Cross Plan."u Blue Cross refused to enter into an agreement with National
because of a preexisting policy barring participation by any new hospital
that did not receive construction approval from the area HSA. 10 In a prior
announcement, the local HSA stated that the agency would not approve
any additional hospitals of the type National intended to provide.' As
a result of the announced policy, National did not seek HSA approval for
construction, leading to the refusal of participating hospital status by Blue
Cross.1
07
National brought suit against Blue Cross alleging a wrongful refusal
to deal and a conspiracy between Blue Cross and the HSA.0 8 The district
court granted Blue Cross's motion for summary judgment, holding that
Blue Cross acted pursuant to the Planning Act and the antitrust laws,
and that, consequently, Blue Cross was immune under the implied repeal
doctrine."9 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
the doctrine of implied immunity applied to Blue Cross' action in requir-
ing National to obtain construction approval from the area HSA."'
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding no clear repugnancy
between Blue Cross's actions taken within the provisions of the Planning
Act and the antitrust law."' The Court noted, however, that the merits
of the antitrust claim remained for the parties to litigate on remand, when
the trial court should consider the economic factors underlying the alleged
conspiracy and refusal to deal." In denying antitrust immunity for Blue
Cross's actions, the Court reviewed the structure and function of the Plan-
10 I& Under the participating hospital agreement, participating hospitals received direct
reimbursement of the full cost of covered services rendered to individual Blue Cross
subscribers. Id. When subscribers receive care in nonparticipating hospitals, Blue Cross
pays only 80% of the cost directly to the subscriber, rather than directly to the hospital. Id.
"I Id. Blue Cross's policy provided that new participating hospitals must meet a clear-
ly evident need for health services in a defined service area. Id. at 381 n.3. The policy fur-
ther provided that the area health planning agency would approve the health care institu-
tions and services under the Planning Act. Id.
10" Id. The local HSA in National Gerimedical determined that a surplus of beds ex-
isted in the area and therefore the agency would not approve any addition of acute-care
beds in area hospitals. Id.
1"1 Id. at 382.
108 Id. Plaintiff National sought treble damages and an injunction to prevent future
violations. Id.
109 National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City,
479 F. Supp. 1012, 1024 (W.D. Mo. 1979); see supra notes 80 & 81 and accompanying text
(discussion of implied repeal doctrine).
... National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City,
628 F.2d 1050, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 1980). The Eighth Circuit determined that Congress, in
passing the Planning Act, intended to immunize from the antitrust laws the type of action
challenged in National Gerimedical. Id.
11 452 U.S. at 393.
112 Id. at 393 n.19.
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ning Act.' The Court also noted that the 1979 amendments to the Plann-
ing Act, requiring the promotion of competition in the health industry,
indicated congressional recognition of a distinction between areas in which
competition was useful and areas in which an allocation of resources was
necessary.' Considering National's claim that the Planning Act implied
a repeal of the antitrust laws, the Court emphasized that no governmen-
tal regulatory body compelled or approved Blue Cross's action in denying
participating hospital status. Because the state of Missouri had not im-
plemented the Planning Act at the time the events of the case occurred,
the Court considered the function of the local HSA to be no more than
the function of a private planning body." 6 The Court found the lack of
an established state regulatory agency to be crucial because of the general
principle that disfavors antitrust repeals when a governmental entity
does not consider the antitrust implications of a business decision.
1 7
The National Gerimedical Court also rejected National's claim that
Congress intended the Planning Act to immunize all private conduct taken
in response to health planing activities. " 8 The Court noted that the 1979
Amendments advocated competition in the health system without chang-
ing the basic planning structure."' The Court held, therefore, that any
incompatibility between the Planning Act and antitrust concerns was not
sufficiently great to create a blanket repeal of the antitrust laws."' The
Court noted in a footnote, however, that the holding did not foreclose
future claims of antitrust immunity in other factual contexts. " ' The Court,
113 Id. at 383-88. The National Gerimedical Court noted that Congress intended the
Planning Act's elaborate structure to remedy deficiencies in the performance of the healthcare
industry. Id. at 386. The deficiencies included the anticompetitive effects of the medical
marketplace that precluded cost efficiency and the maldistribution of health care facilities. Id.
' Id. at 387; see 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(b(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (planning agencies should
give priority to action that strengthen effect of competition on supply of health services;
supra notes 4648 and accompanying text (1979 Amendments to Planning Act to improve
competition in health industry).
"' 452 U.S. at 389-40.
11 Id. at 390.
" Id. The National Gerimedical Court refused to hold that an HSA recommendation
justifies antitrust immunity because such a holding would give the recommendation greater
force than Congress intended. Id. at 391.
116 Id. at 391-92. The National Gerimedical Court recognized the argument that Con-
gress, in passing the Planning Act, did not consider competition to be a relevant factor
in the health industry. Id. at 392. The Court considered meritorous the argument that Con-
gress intended cooperation and planning in the health industry without the interference
of antitrust suits. Id. In National Gerimedical, however, the Court found that the plaintiffs
failed to make the showing that regulation was necessary for an exemption of all actions
of health care providers. Id. In refusing a blanket exemption, the court found no indication
that Congress intended a different result with respect to the health care industry. Id.
"I Id. at 392-93; see supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussion of 1979
Amendments).
,' 452 U.S. at 392-93.
Id. at 393 n.18.
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as an example, cited the situation in which an HSA advocates a form of cost-
saving cooperation among providers."
The National Gerimedical holding was the basis for the Sixth Cir-
cuit's recent decision in Huron Valley Hospital, Inc., v. City of Pontiac,"3
involving a dispute over a state health agency's issuance of a CON.' Huron
Valley Hospital, Inc. (Huron) was a nonprofit organization formed for the
purpose of building a new hospital.'2 5 In 1976, Huron applied for a CON
requesting approval for construction of the hospital." The state health
agency for Michigan, upon the recommendation of the local HSA, refused
to issue a CON to Huron and instead issued a CON allowing a competitor,
Pontiac General Hospital (Pontiac) to rebuild its existing hospital.' Huron
brought an antitrust action, alleging that Pontiac conspired with the plan-
ning agencies to bar Huron from entering the market." The district court
held, on the merits, that the Planning Act provided the defendants with
a blanket exemption from antitrust liability."9 In an alternative holding,
the district court concluded that the state action exemption and Noerr-
Pennington doctrine shielded the defendants from antitrust liability. 3'
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit relied on National Gerimedical to hold
that the Planning Act did not effect an implied repeal of the antitrust
laws." The Huron court noted that the issue left open in National
Gerimedical, whether actions taken directly pursuant to mandatory plan-
ning statutes are immune from antitrust liability, was present on the facts
of Huron." The Sixth Circuit, however, declined to decide the merits of
12 Id. The National Gerimedical Court noted that the situation surrounding the man-
dated planning activities of an HSA differs significantly from the situation in the National
Gerimedical case. Id. The conduct at issue in National Gerimedical was not cooperation
among providers, but an insurer's refusal to deal with a provider that failed to follow the
advice of an HSA. Id.
12 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981).
12 Id. at 1031.
,2 Id. at 1030.
' Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301, 1304 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
12 Id. at 1305-06.
12 Id. at 1306.
' Id. at 1312. The district court in Huron based the blanket exemption of health plan-
ning activities on the legislative history of the Planning Act. Id.; see 1974 SENATE REPORT,
supra note 8, at 39 (health care industry does not respond to classic marketplace forces)
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 7842, 7878.
12 Id. at 1311-12.
131 666 F.2d at 1033-34. The Sixth Circuit in Huron cited the Supreme Court's decision
in National Gerimedical, holding that the Planning Act is not so incompatible with antitrust
concerns that the Act creates a pervasive repeal of the antitrust laws. Id.; see National
Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378, 392-93
(1981) (Planning Act does not create blanket repeal of antitrust laws in health planning
area); supra notes 101-122 (discussion of National Gerimedical).
"3 Id. at 1031. The Huron court noted that the conflict between the regulatory action
and the Sherman Act in Huron was more direct than the conflict confronting the Supreme
Court in National Gerimedical. Id.; cf. National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center
v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378, 114 (1981) (National Gerinedical is weak case
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Huron's antitrust action, pending the outcome of state proceedings.'"
Courts that refused to find implied immunity for conduct that the plain-
tiff alleges violates antitrust laws must decide whether to analyze the
challenged conduct under a per se or rule of reason approach."' In Medical
Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connec-
ticut, Inc., ' Medical Arts Pharmacy (Medical) brought an action against
Blue Cross charging that Blue Cross's pharmacy agreements were per
se illegal price fixing arrangements in violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act."3 Under the Blue Cross program, subscribers could obtain
prescription drugs from pharmacies at little or no cost beyond the pay-
ment of premiums."' A contract between Blue Cross and the participating
pharmacy set forth the terms under which the pharmacy would provide
prescription drugs to Blue Cross subscribers.'38 The pharmacy agreement
also provided a maximum billable amount that Blue Cross would reim-
burse participating pharmacies for any drug sold. '39
The district court in Medical Arts denied Medical's motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding the per se rule of illegality inapplicable to the
for deciding immunity question because no regulatory structure existed at time of case).
13 Id. at 1035-36. In State of North Carolina ex rel Edmunsten v. P.LA. Asheville, Inc.,
the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina found implied
antitrust immunity on facts involving a direct conflict between mandatory planning statutes
and the antitrust laws. See 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,764, 71,706 (W.D.N.C. 1982). In
P.LA. Asheville, North Carolina's Department of Human Resources granted a CON to the
corporate operator of a psychiatric hospital in Asheville to operate a second hospital in
the area. Id. at 71,702-03. Considering charges of monopolistic practices against the defen-
dant corporation, the district court held that a repugnancy existed between the regulatory
provisions governing hospital acquisitions in the state and the antitrust laws and, therefore,
the hospital acquisition was exempt from antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 71,706. The district court,
noting the Supreme Court's reasoning in National Gerinedical, found that antitrust review
of the hospital acquisition was needless and inappropriate because a regulatory body, in
the form of the State Department of Human Resources, considered the antitrust implica-
tions of the acquisition. Id. at 71,707; see National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center
v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1981) (courts should reject claims for
immunity when no governmental or regulatory body compelled or considered antitrust
implications of challenged action).
"3 See infra notes 135-62 and accompanying text (discussion of antitrust cases analyz-
ing different approaches).
" 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982).
135 Id. at 504; see supra text accompanying note 75 (price fixing is per se illegal under
Sherman Act; note 65 (S 1 of Sherman Act).
137 675 F2d at 503.
"I Id. Blue Cross's pharmacy program provided for a contract between Blue Cross and
individual subscribers to determine the level of benefits for each insured. Id. The subscriber
contract permits the insured to obtain prescription drugs from either a participating or
nonparticipating pharmacy.
"I Id. If the subscriber purchases the drugs from a nonparticipating pharmacy, Blue
Cross reimburses the subscriber in an amount no greater than the reimbursement amount
paid to a participating pharmacy. Id. If the subscriber selects a participating pharmacy,
Blue Cross directly reimburses the pharmacy, while the subscriber receives the drug at
no out-of-pocket expense. Id.
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Blue Cross pharmacy agreement because the agreement was not price
fixing within the scope of the per se prohibition.141 On appeal, the Second
Circuit held that the district court properly declined to apply the per se
rule because Blue Cross pharmacy agreements are novel restraints with
potential procompetitive effects, and, therefore, the courts should analyze
the agreements under the rule of reason." The Second Circuit emphasized
that the pharmacy agreements were not manifestly anticompetitive or
formulated for the purpose of restraining competition among the individual
pharmacies.'
While the Second Circuit in Medical Arts dealt with the per se rule
concerning the activities of third-party payors, the Fourth Circuit in
Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital' recently considered
whether courts properly may apply the per se rule to measure allega-
tions of refusals to deal concerning the planning activities of private health
service providers.'44 Hospital Building Company (HBC), corporate operator
of a small proprietary hospital, brought an antitrust action against Rex
Hospital (Rex), a nonprofit hospital, alleging that Rex and other
coconspirators acted in concert to block the planned relocation and ex-
pansion of Mary Elizabeth Hospital, which HBC operated.', HBC asserted
that the conspirators planned to bar the expansion by preventing HBC
from receiving a CON for construction of the new hospital. 4 ' In addition,
HBC attempted to prove that a secondary plan provided for the imposi-
tion of a discriminatory reimbursement schedule to reduce HBC's profits.'47
The district court dismissed the action on the ground that HBC's
business was local and, therefore, the plaintiff had failed to show a suffi-
cient connection between the alleged Sherman Act violations and interstate
"' Id. at 503-04; Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stanford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Connecticut, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (D. Conn. 1981). The district court in Medical
Arts held that the agreement was not price fixing within the scope of the per se prohibition
because Blue Cross was a purchaser of the prescribed drugs and, therefore, simply was
contracting with other parties to sell goods. Id.
1 675 F2d at 505-06.
142 Id. at 506. The business of insurance is exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. See 15 U.S.C. S 1011-1015 (1976) (Sherman Act applies to business
of insurance to extent that the state does not regulate the challenged insurance practice).
To qualify for the exemption, the anticompetitive practices must be part of the business
of insurance. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211, 215-21
(1979) (Court limits business of insurance exemption to insurance contracts between insurers
and insured, risk spreading activities, and practices limited to entities within insurance
industry). Another requirement for the McCarran-Ferguson exemption is that state law
must regulate the anticompetitive practice. Id. S 1012. In addition, the exemption does not
extend to any agreement to or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation. Id. § 1013(b).
1 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1982).
14 Id. at 686.
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commerce.148 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal... and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari."' The Court reversed the lower court's dismissal,
holding that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to satisfy the jurisdic-
tional requirements of the Sherman Act.'-' The Court found that the allega-
tions, if proven, could show that the conspiracy resulted in unreasonable
burdens on the free and uninterrupted flow of interstate commerce.'52 On
remand to decide the antitrust claims, the district court entered treble
damages judgments against the defendants."'
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that courts generally regard con-
certed refusals to deal and allocation schemes as per se violations of the
antitrust laws. ' The court decided, however, to apply a narrow rule of
reason approach to permit the defendants to show, if possible, that plann-
ing activities, otherwise in violation of the Sherman Act, might not be
unreasonable in certain circumstances."' The Fourth Circuit based its
modificaion of the per se rule on Congress' intent to encourage participa-
tion by private health care providers in the planning process."6 In defin-
ing the scope of the modified rule, the Fourth Circuit specified that plan-
ning activities of private health services providers are not unreasonable
restraints if the activities are undertaken in good faith to prevent needless
duplication of health care resources in an affected area.1
The Fourth Circuit noted that the critical question in the application
of the narrow rule of reason is whether the duplication of resources, osten-
sibly avoided by planning, is in fact needless duplication."' Proper applica-
tion of the rule, therefore, requires the fact-finder to determine that
urgency of the health care needs in relation to the health needs of the
consumer public in the market area at the time in question and not in
relation to the economic or other needs of the planners."' The Fourth Cir-
148 Id.
1 Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 511 F.2d 678, 682 (4th Cir. 1975).
Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
Id. at 739-40.
" Id. at 746. The Fourth Circuit found that the complaint was sufficient to establish
a claim under the Sherman Act without requiring allegations that the conspiracy threaten-
ed out-of-state businesses or that the conspiracy affected market prices. Id. at 746-47.
Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 511 F.2d 678, 683 (4th Cir. 1975).
11 Id. at 684. The Rex court noted that under the per se rule, the court presumes the
anticompetitive impact of the alleged offense. Id. Under the rule of reason, the Fourth Cir-
cuit added, the plaintiff must prove the anticompetitive effect. Id.
' Id. at 685.
'5 Id. at 685-6. The Fourth Circuit in Rex noted that health planning legislation
anticipated participation in planning by health care providers. Id. at 685. The court found
participation desirable because of the waste and impracticability of engaging in health care
planning without drawing on the expertise of local hospital administrators and physicians. Id.
"I Id. at 686. The Rex court cautioned that courts cannot interprete statutory authori-
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cuit also decided that courts employing the narrow rule of reason should
specify that the defendant has the burden of establishing as an affirmative
defense the reasonableness of the challenged planning activities.' The
plaintiff initially would bear the burden of establishing a prima facie case
by demonstrating that certin planning conduct constituted a per se viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.1"' The burden then would shift
to the defendant to persuade the trier of fact by a preponderance of the
evidence that the challenged conduct served only to avoid a needless
duplication of health care resources. 2
The policy issues that health care antitrust cases raise reflect the
genuine conflict between antitrust principles and health planning
activities.63 The conflict seems likely to continue until Congress express-
ly repeals the application of the Sherman Act to the health care industry
or indicates that the antitrust laws apply to health planning activities."
Two divergent principles lie at the root of the conflict, one principle ad-
vocating competition through the enforcement of the Sherman Act and
the other claiming that health care regulation is necessary even if regula-
tion clashes with the antitrust laws.'65 Critics of the feasibility of the an-
titrust approach question whether the antitrust ideal of free and unfet-
tered competition is an appropriate goal in a field in which policy con-
siderations concerning human lives are at stake. 6 Competition as an
answer to the problem of rising health care costs also raises questions
about the workability and fairness of competitive proposals for the poor,




'6 See supra text accompanying notes 1-8 (conflict between antitrust and health care
laws).
1 See id. (same).
165 See supra notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text (divergent views on solutions to health
care problems).
1" See Marmor, Boyer, & Greenberg, supra note 18, at 1026. Critics of the application
of antitrust laws to the health industry note that antitrust actions seek to encourage com-
petition without regard to the impact that competitive forces might have on costs and pro-
fessionalism of medical practice. Id.
167 See Dunham, Morone, & White, Restoring Medical Markets: Implications for the Poor,
7 J. HEALTH, POL., POLY & L. 488, 488-90 (1982). Current proposals for injecting competi-
tion in health care may reduce significantly the health services that the poor receive. Id.
at 488. Two elements of procompetitive proposals threaten the development of a two-tier
medical system for the affluent and the poor. Id. First, the proposals advocate the use of
vouchers, which allow members of group health plans and recipients of Medicare and Medicaid
to select alternative insurance packages. Id. at 490-91. Most plans propose to measure the
cost of vouchers at the mean expenditure of the general population for health care plans.
Id. Because the average cost of serving the poor is greater than the current national expen-
diture, the voucher may set prices below the expected cost of adequate health service.
Id. at 490. Providers as a result would be unwilling or unable to serve the poor properly. Id.
The second element of procompetitive proposals that threatens health care for the poor
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concerns that recent medical antitrust actions raise particularly in view
of the potential effect of antitrust actions on the quality of health care.6 '
Despite the legitimacy of the concerns raised by critics of the antitrust
approach, the damaging fact remains that health planning proponents are
unable to demonstrate that the Planning Act as enforced through CON
legislation is effective in keeping costs down or allocating resources."9
Justificatons for CON legislation are difficult to evaluate because the.
substantial lag time between the CON process and the date at which the
CON-approved facility begins service means some effects are not im-
mediately observable.' The effectiveness of CON legislation also is dif-
ficult to evaluate because many CON statutes contain "grandfathering"
clauses that allow projects initiated before the effective date of the statute
to proceed without CON review. 71 Consequently, any research data on
the effects of CON laws are tentative and often contradictory.72 Another
are Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and other competiting systems of health
care delivery. Id. at 488-489; see infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text (discussion of
HMOs). HMOs, despite sensible and innovative features, affect only some of the causes
of health inflation and, therefore, are not likely to halt the rise in medical costs. Id. at
489-90. With rising costs unchecked, the government's main alternative to control of expen-
ditures would be controlling the vouchers of the poor and elderly. Id. at 493. If increases
in voucher prices do not keep pace with the real increase in medical costs, the poor's ability
to purchase access to care would decline. Id. at 494. Even if the government does not index
the voucher to the Consumer Price Index, drastic cuts in monetary support programs for
the poor may result. Id. at 492-93; see also Sigelman, Palm-Reading The Invisible Hand: A
Critical Examination of Pro-Competitive Reform Proposals, 6 J. HEALTH, POL., & L. 578, 593
(1982) (under voucher system, undersubsidization of high-risk, low-income persons could result).
1I See Rosoff, supra note 1, at 478. The medical antitrust enforcement issue leaves
open the question of how many changes the health care section can absorb before serious
deterioration of quality will result. Id. One proposal is antitrust legislation tailored to the
special needs of the health industry. Id. at 479-80.
' Health Planning, supra note 1, at 317; infra text accompanying notes 170-75 (dif-
ficulties in assessing efficiency on CON legislation).
1I Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 5, at 23. The youth of many CON programs combined
with the lag-time problem makes some effects of CON not immediately observable. Id. CON
programs, furthermore, may develop effectiveness only with the experience gained over
time. Id.
1 Id. In addition to lag-time and grandfathering clause problems, evaluation of CON's
effectiveness requires the employment of special statistical techniques. Id. at 23-24. Another
difficulty of CON evaluation is the interaction between CON and other regulatory mechanisms,
such as Section 1122 of the Social Security Amendments of 1972. Id. at 24. Finally, the
impact of a CON law may depend on the political environment of the state and the state's
previous experience with various forms of regulation. Id.
" See Benjamin & Downs, Evaluating the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act: Learning from Experience?, 7 J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L. 707, 709-20 (1982).
As critical as the accurate assessment of the Planning Act is for the development of an
improved technology of health planning, major problems exist in evaluating the effectiveness
of the legislation. Id. at 709. Among the difficulties in assessing health planning is an in-
ability to predict the full consequences of planning decisions because of unanticipated con-
sequences that accompany broad policy decisions. Id. at 710. In addition, the broad respon-
sibilities assigned health planning agencies by the Planning Act makes the collection of
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difficulty in justisfying CON legislation is the potential for domination
of the planning process by the health industry.'73 Because CON laws re-
quire industry participation in health planning, industry representatives
have the opportunity to implement anticompetitive strategies and to
manipulate favorable determinations of need.' Furthermore, CON legisla-
tion does not address many of the major problems underlying the health
care crises, including the inefficiencies of third-party programs and the
special characteristics of the physician-hospital relationship that reduce
cost-effective incentives. 5
The criticisms of CON legislation indicate a need to remove obstacles
to open competition and give free market forces a chance to work.'
Antitrust law offers the most effective means at present to increase com-
petition in the medical industry.171 Other procompetitive reform proposals
advanced as solutions to the existing health regulatory problem contain
critical deficiencies that make antitrust enforcement an attractive
alternative."8
data both time consuming and expensive. Id. at 709. The decentralized nature of the plann-
ing system, the limited amount of regulatory control vested in HSAs, and the latitude granted
the planning agencies to implement the Planning Act's provisions also contribute to the
difficulty in measuring health regulation. Id. at 713.
" See Miller, supra note 5, at 917. In controlling the planning process, providers can
block competing providers' proposals and advance personal interests. Id. Government in-
tervention in health planning thereby becomes more difficult to justify, either politically
or economically. Id. Furthermore, the potential for damage under regulatory capture is
great because government involvement in planning constitutes a formidable obstacle to
reform. Id.; see supra note 62 (potential for industry domination exists because providers
participate in need determination); C. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE
INDUSTRY, 1711 (1982) (local health planning exhibits characteristics of cartel) [hereinafter
cited as INDUSTRY].
'' See supra note 62 (Planning Act requires industry participation).
175 See Health Planning, supra note 1, at 318 (CON addressed only symptoms of health
care problem and not cause); supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text (deficiencies of health
care market).
17 See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text (criticisms of CON legislation).
See infra notes 207-21 (arguments in favor of application of antitrust laws to health
care industry).
17 See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH CONG. 1ST SESS., DESCRIP-
TION OF PROPOSALS TO STIMULATE COMPETITION IN THE FINANCING AND DELIVERY OF HEALTH
CARE 1-12 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as STAFF DESCRIPTION] (review of present
health care laws and explanation of proposed changes contained in each procompetitive
bill). Proponents of the procompetitive approach introduced a number of proposals in the
97th Congress including H.R. 850 National Health Reform Act of 1981 introduced by Represen-
tative Gephardt; S. 139 Comprehensive Health Care Reform Act of 1981 introduced by Senator
Hatch; and S. 433 Health Incentives Reform Act of 1981 introduced by Senator Durenberger.
STAFF DESCRIPTION, supra, at 1. Procompetitive advocates argue that a significant factor
in the recent rise in health care costs is the present method of payment in the health care
system. Id. Inflationary payment schemes cited by reformers include third-party payments
that insulate consumers from the real cost of health care, fee-for-service reimbursement
to physicians that encourages physicians to increase the quantity and price of services,
cost reimbursements to hospitals, and tax deductions and exclusions that encourage employers
and employees to choose the most costly health care plans. Id.; infra notes 179-88 (critique
of alternative procompetitive reform proposals).
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One type of reform proposal advocates consumer sovereignty by
making the consumer responsible for a greater proportion of health in-
surance costs and by reducing or eliminating tax subsidies for the pur-
chase of health insurance.179 The theory underlying consumer cost-sharing
is that consumer responsibility for significant proportions of the cost of
health care will alert the patient to the need for economizing measures.
180
One means to make patients and doctors aware of the actual costs of
medical care is to reshape health insurance by creating tax incentives
for consumers to select more cost-efficient insurance plans."' The Inter-
nal Revenue Code (Code) currently provides that employees and other
taxpayers may claim deductions for their health insurance contributions
and certain medical expenses."' The Code further permits employers to
deduct as a business expense employer contributions to employee health
plans.1 3 In addition to tax deductibles for health expenses, the Code pro-
vides that an employer's contribution to his employee's health insurance
plan is not included in the employee's gross income for income tax
purposes."u Some procompetitive approaches propose either to reduce or
eliminate the medical expense and employer business expense deductions
or to convert the medical expense deduction to a tax credit.Y' Another
feature of many procompetitive reform proposals is a limitation on the
tax subsidy for provision of health insurance by employers.88
Criticism of consumer cost-sharing stems from evidence that cost-
sharing may be more expensive than health care costs under the present
system because consumers covered by cost-sharing plans tend to postpone
1 Marmor, Boyer & Greenberg, supra note 18, at 1011-12.
E Id- at 1012.
181 Id
' I.R.C. § 213 (P-H 1983). The Internal Revenue Code (Code) limits itemized deduc-
tions up to $150 per one half of the amount of the taxpayor's health insurance contribu-
tions. Id. The Code permits deductions for medical expenses, including insurance premium
amounts, and drug expenses, to the extent that the expenses exceed three percent of the
individual's adjusted gross income. Id. S 213.
1 Id. 162.
18 Id. 160.
1 STAFF DESCRIPTION, supra note 178, at 4.
1 Id. Procompetitive advocates claim that the current tax subsidy for provision of
health insurance by employers encourages employers and employees to choose plans that
are more costly than is necessary. Id.; see Sigelman, supra note 167, at 579-80 (under employer
contribution plans employees have no immediate incentive to select less expensive, lower-
option plans). By placing a limit on the contribution which the employee may exclude, reform
proponents argue that employees will be more cost conscious in selecting a health plan
because any amount paid by the employer in excess of the exclusion limitation is taxable
to the employee. STAFF DESCRIPTION, supra note 178, at 4; see Marmor, Boyer & Greenberg,
supra note 18, at 1013 (elimination of tax subsidy for employer contributions will lead con-
sumers to purchase economically rational level of coverage). As an additional incentive to
purchase low cost health plans, many procompetitive proposals provide than an employee
who chooses a health plan in which the premium is less than the employer contribution
amount would receive a cash rebate on his benefits. STAFF DESCRIPTION, supra note 178,
at 4. See generally, INDUSTRY; supra note 173, at 387-96 (overview of tax treatment of
employer-paid health insurance premiums).
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preventative outpatient physician visits until they require more costly
inpatient care."' Consumers also may compromise the effectiveness of cost-
sharing programs by choosing to purchase supplementary insurance to
fill gaps in reduced cost-sharing provisions.188 Cost-sharing plans further-
more may impose federal regulation over the currently state-regulated
health insurance industry.18 Because unregulated marketing of health in-
surance plans poses a potential threat to the program's ability to control
provider prices,19 the cost-sharing approach would restrict entry into the
health insurance plan system by federal CON legislation.' The federal
government, therefore, would decide whether a proposed plan meets the
requirements for benefits and coverage. 9 ' As a result, the cost-sharing
scheme would exchange the present system of federal health controls for
another, more expensive system, and, in addition, could exacerbate at the
federal level the problems associated with CON legislation.93
While consumer cost-sharing reforms propose to control health care
costs, other procompetitive reforms propose to restructure the existing
form of fee-for-service (FFS) delivery into primarily prepaid group prac-
tices that would compete with FFS providers on the basis of adequate
delivery of service at competitive prices.' One of the alternative forms
.. See Sigelman, supra note 169, at 583-84. Cost-sharing plans containing increased deduc-
tibles, coinsurance, and copayment provisions tend to reduce patient-initiated medical ser-
vices, particularly for lower income individuals and families. Id. at 584. Individuals who
postpone needed outpatient treatment until they require hospitalization face the steep costs
of important treatment, which could offset any savings gained by lower physician utiliza-
tion rates. Id.
"I See Sigelman, supra note 167, at 583 (cost control promise of consumer cost-sharing
programs compromised by supplementation of reduced coverage); Marmor, Boyer, &
Greenberg, supra note 18, at 1015 (same).
1" Id. at 581; see infra text accompanying notes 189-93 (federal CON legislation pro-
posed for health insurance plans).
19 Sigelman, supra note 167, at 581. The fear of an unregulated, free market approach
to health care plans stems from the belief than an oversupply of health care packages would
split the medical market into several factions, thereby destroying any significant leverage
over providers' behavior. See id. at 603 n.25 (citing ENTHOVEN, COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH
CARE SECTOR: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 347 (W. Greenberg ed. 1978) (too many third-
party intermediaries will not permit any one party to sufficiently represent hospitals' or
physicians' business in order to influence providers' behavior).
"I Sigelman, supra note 167, at 581.
192 Id.
193 See id. at 583 (competitive strategies merely trade one sweeping regulatory regime
for another); supra notes 169-75 (deficiencies of CON legislation).
19 Marmor, Boyer & Greenberg, supra note 18, at 1016-17. A broad definition of prepaid
group practice is a medical care delivery system that accepts responsibility for the organiza-
tion, financing, and delivery of health care services for a defined population. Note, The Role
of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARv. L. REV. 887, 901
(1971). The prepaid group practice combines a prepayment financing mechanism with a group
practice system of delivery by means of a managerial-administrative organization that pro-
vides service to an enroled population. Id. The strategy underlying the provision of multi-
ple packages of comprehensive health care is that consumers will choose the plan which
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of financing and delivery schemes are Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs), which propose to charge subscribers an annual fixed fee in
exchange for health service based on need, and thereby control costs while
creating competition among providers."' Congress passed the Federal
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973196 (HMO Act) to support and
encourage the development of an efficient health care system." The HMO
Act enabled the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to spend
up to $375 million for grants and loans to support the planning and opera-
tion of 300-500 new HMOs throughout the United States."' Another form
of delivery service is the Consumer Choice Health Plan (CCHP), which
offers consumers a choice of different health packages on the premises
that consumers will choose less expensive plans.199
provides adequate coverage at the lowest cost. STAFF DESCRIPTION, supra note 178, at 1.
Procompetitive proposals frequently require an employer to offer a choice of health benefit
plans to his employees with an equal contribution by the employer to each plan. Id. at 4.
If the employer fails to offer a choice of qualified health plans, the proposals would deny
the employee tax subsidy for employer contributions to health plans or deny the employer's
business expense deduction. Id at 4-5. The major requirements for the employer's contribu-
tions to qualify for the exclusion or deduction include a minimum benefit package, family
coverage to include the beneficiary's spouse and children, continuity of coverage in case
of death or changes in marital or employment status, and catastrophic coverage in which
the plan pays the full amount of any covered expenses once the beneficiary's out-of-pocket
expenses reach a specified annual limit. Id. at 5.
z" Kissam, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Role of Antitrust Law, 1978 DUKE
L.J. 487, 488 (1978). HMOs may threaten the noneconomic interests of FFS physicians because
of the different nature of HMO goals and methods. Id. at 490. One distinctive characteristic
of HMOs is the organization's comprehensive and intergrated provision of insurance and
provider services that allows the organization to budget further in advance. Id. at 490.
A fixed budget creates greater incentives to deliver services economically than any incen-
tives existing in the FFS section. Id. Another characteristic of the HMOs is the quality
improvements that could result from the program's financial and organizational structure.
Id- HMO physicians, for example, should have fewer incentives than FFS physicians to refrain
from referrals or consultations because HMO physicians paid on a salaried basis will lose
less income from referrals or consultations than their FFS counterparts. Id at 490-91. A
final characteristic of HMOs that may threaten FFS providers is the HMO use of clinical
forms of medicine and delegation of medical functions to nonphysicians. Id. at 491. The
HMOs' distinctively commercial attitude toward the delivery of medical care could influence
public perceptions on the nature of medical practice and also could threaten the physician's
sense of personal security and relative social positions in the community. Id.
'" 42 U.S.C. S 300e (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
.. See id. (HMO legislation).
" Id. at § 300e-8. Amendments to the Federal Health Maintenance Organization Act
in 1976 attempted to expand qualification standards for the program's organization. See
Health Maintenance Organization Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-460, 90 Stat. 1945
(1976) (codified in scattered sections of 21, 26, 29, 40, and 42 U.S.C (1976).
'" See Lynk, Regulation & Competition: An Examination of the Consumer Choice Health
Plan, 6 J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L. 625, 626 (1982). The Consumer Choice Health Plan
(CCHP) proposes to facilitate the consumer choice of different health packages by remov-
ing checks on competition among suppliers of health care financing plans. Id. The principal
features include a maximum ceiling established on the amount of nontaxable employer's
contribution per employee for health care, federal certification of all proposed health coverage
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The conclusion that competitive delivery systems can provide health
care more efficiently that FFS services raises several reservations and
qualificatons.0 0 One reservation is whether HMOs actually reduce health
care costs."0 ' Another criticism of the competitive delivery system is the
charge that consumer cost efficiency incentives will have limited effects
on the health care system because most health care inefficiencies result
from provider decisions.2 '
A further obstacle to the development of alternative delivery systems
is the predominant position of uniform health insurance plans offered by
employers to employees."' The medical profession also continues to resist
attempts to provide alternative health financing plans for quality care
reasons and also because present third-party payment schemes foster con-
sumer demand for medical services."4 The strong resistance to alternative
plans with employer contribution to a nonqualifying plan treated as taxable income to the
employee, and a minimum of three coverage options offered by an employer to each employee.
Id. at 626-27.
"' Homer, Some Pitfalls in Creating Competition between HMOs and Fee-for-Service
Delivery, 7 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 686, 686-87 (1982); see infra notes 200-06 and accom-
panying text (qualifications on effectiveness of competitive delivery systems).
201 Id. at 687-89. Several qualifications exist concerning the HMOs ability to control
health care costs effectively. Id. First, most of the cost-savings through HMO programs
stem from the program's lower use of hospital services. Id. at 687. Second, the independent
practice association (IPA) variant of the HMO is not less costly than FFS health care, yet,
IPA's growth rate is greater than other HMO forms. Id. Third, the studies on effectiveness
often use inconsistent measures, which makes reaching a conclusion on the issue difficult.
Id. at 687-88. A fourth reservation on the ability of HMOs to contain costs is evidence that
HMOs reduce hospital use by eliminating not only unnecessary care, but also by skimping
on the use of necessary hospital care. Id. at 688-89. The final qualification on HMO effec-
tiveness in containing costs is evidence that HMO programs have approximately the same
costs per unit of service as FFS providers, resulting, therefore, in a growth of costs only
slightly slower than the FFS system. Id. at 689.
202 See Homer, supra note 199, at 703. Experience with HMOs demonstrates that pro-
vider incentives are more important than consumer ones. Id. Under the transition from
FFS to HMO programs, evidence shows that consumer incentives produce slight increases
in outpatient care use while provider decisions drastically reduce hospital care. Id. Pro-
competitive programs that emphasize changing consumer incentives in the purchase of care,
therefore, are not practical solutions to the increasing costs of medical care. Id. One pro-
posal for the realistic treatment of HMOs is to recognize the program's value in delivering
health care at slightly lower costs than the FFS system, rather than using the program
as a tool in building a competitive system. See generally Christianson, The Impact of HMOs:
Evidence and Research Issues, 5 J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L. 354, 354-66 (1980) (issues iden-
tified for future research on influence of HMOs on health care); Rushefsky, A Critique of
Market Reform in Health Care: The "Consumer-Choice Health Plan", 5 J. HEALTH, POL., POLY
& L. 720, 737 (1981) (CCHP directly affects consumer as weakest link in health care system
and only indirectly affects more effective components of insurers and providers).
I Marmor, Boyer, & Greenberg, supra note 18, at 1018. Advocates of alternative delivery
systems seek to loosen the employer grip over health insurance by limiting or eliminating
the tax subsidy of employer-provided health insurance benefits. Id.; see supra note 179 (efforts
to reshape health insurance through creation of tax incentives).
I See Havighurst, supra note 4, at 305-06. The medical professions' resistance to the
development of procompetitive health care plans centers on attempts to alter the FFS system
of payment, to create physician panels as competitive alternatives to traditional insurance
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health plans raises doubts whether the plans can alter the health system
on the scale necessary to develop significant competition between
providers.20 5 Development of HMOs, for example, has not been rapid or
widespread. 6 Estimates reveal that at current rates, HMOs could cover
only ten percent of the population by 1990. '
The deficiencies of the two major types of procompetitive reforms
lend credence to the argument that the establishment of a competitive
health care market through antitrust enforcement is the most viable alter-
native to regulation.2 8 The significant potential for regulatory capture of
the planning process by health providers suggests the vigorous applica-
tion of the antitrust laws that Congress designed specifically to prohibit
anticompetitive activities of the type engaged in by providers." Unlike
other procompetitive measures, the procedures already exist to imple-
ment antitrust action without requiring massive new regulatory
measures. 10 Furthermore, antitrust laws give the private sector a chance
to pursue cost-containment policies through suits brought by private
citizens.' Enforcement of antitrust laws also may help remove anti-
competitive obstacles barring the development of HMOs.212
plans which provide free choice of physician, and to impose administrative checks on physi-
cian and patient decisions that affect the expenditure of insurance funds. Id. at 306. Profes-
sional attempts to frustrate innovative health plans include the use of health planning and
CON mechanisms, organizing competing physician-sponsored health plans, and state and
local medical societies' efforts to control changes in insurers' benefit packages. Id. at 317-18;
see also supra note 187 (characteristics of HMOs that threaten medical society).
222 Marmor, Boyer & Greenberg, supra note 18, at 1021.
See Havighurst, supra note 4, at 305 (medical profession successfully resists HMO
development); Kissam, supra note 195, at 488-89 (HMO development may continue to face
variety of anticompetitive restraints from FFS physicians and allies); Rosoff, Phase Two
of the Federal HMO Development Progran; New Directors After a Shaky Start, 1 AM. J. L.
& MED. 209, 211-12 (1975) (spread of HMOs face barriers including physician and hospital
opposition, prohibitive financial organizing costs, consumer ignorance of HMO system, and
state laws that prohibit prepaid group practice programs). But see Harrison & Kimberly,
Private and Public Initiatives in Health Maintenance Organizations, 7 J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y
& L. 81, 81-93 (1982). The policy debates over the cost effectiveness of HMOs do not over-
shadow the fact that HMOs will be forces in the health care sector in the 1980s. Id. at
80. Mature HMOs plans that developed as a result of private interest over the medical
care aspects of prepaid practice and recent commercial investment interest in HMOs will
form the basis for consolidation and growth of HMO plans. Id. at 82-84. For the future,
the greatest source of enrollment growth will be private investment in large, established
plans with the operating efficiencies and managerial experience to be competitive. Id. at 92.
Marmor, Boyer, & Greenberg, supra note 18, at 1021.
See supra notes 179-206 and accompanying text (deficiencies of consumer cost-sharing
and alternative health financing and delivery plans); infra notes 207-21 (arguments advocating
antitrust enforcement in health industry).
2 See supra notes 65-77 (Sherman Act prohibits activities that are monopolistic or
conspiracies in restraint of trade); notes 60-62 and accompanying text (providers may dominate
health planning process).
21 See Marmor, Boyer, & Greenberg, supra note 18, at 1025 (antitrust proposals have
immediate potential for implementation because no explicit legislative initiative is necessary).
211 See supra note 64 (private parties may bring antitrust action).
212 See Marmor, Boyer, & Greenberg, supra note 18, at 1007 (antitrust action may serve
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Judicial support for antitrust enforcement in the health care market
is apparent from the Supreme Court's refusal in National Gerimedical
to grant a blanket repeal of the antitrust laws regarding voluntary plann-
ing activities."'3 Congress, while silent on the issue of antitrust in both
the Planning Act and the 1979 Amendments, did advocate health care
competition without altering the basic planning structure of the Plann-
ing Act.214 If Congress had intended to immunize health planning from
antitrust scrutiny, significant precedent existed in other regulated fields
for Congress explicitly to create the immunity."'
Whether mandatory planning activities, however, are subject to the
antitrust laws remains an open question."' In the 1979 Amendments, Con-
gress recognized a distinction between areas in which competition serves
a useful purpose and in which competition would not allocate supply
efficiently."7 The National Gerimedical Court noted that the voluntary
nature of the planning activity in the case was decisive in the holding
to reject antitrust immunity.2 8 Neither Congress' nor the Supreme Court's
observations, however, effectively mandate that regulatory planning
activities are exempt from the antitrust laws.219 More persuasive from
to eliminate barriers to the development of competing groups of providers); see also Kissam,
supra note 195, at 489. Application of antitrust laws to the variety of anticompetitive
restraints from FFS providers may protect HMO development from unfair resistance. Id.
Among the anticompetitive restraints that HMOs face are boycotts and refusals to deal
with procompetitive physicians and price discrimination by hospitals for hospital services
that HMOs must purchase in order to provide comprehensive insurance. Id. at 503-20; see
supra note 187 (reasons why HMOs threaten FFS providers).
2,3 See National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City,
452 U.S. 378, 393-94 (1981) (National Gerirnedical Court denies blanket repeal of antitrust
law); supra text accompanying notes 101-22 (discussion of National Gerimedical).
21 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussion of 1979 Amendments).
215 See 49 U.S.C. S 1384 (1976) (Congress explicitly exempted parties affected by certain
orders under the Federal Aviation Act from liability under antitrust laws).
216 See supra text accompanying notes 98-129 (National Gerimedical and Huron deci-
sions leave open issue of immunity for mandatory planning activities).
211 See 42 U.S.C. S 300k-2(b)(2) (1976) (planning agencies must allocate supply for health
services that do not respond to competitive market forces); id. S 300k-2(b)(3) (planning agen-
cies must promote competitive actions for health services that respond to competitive market
forces); supra note 47 (House Committee advocates distinction in conducting CON reviews).
2"8 National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City,
452 U.S. 378, 390 (1981); see supra text accompanying note 113 (antitrust repeals disfavored
where governmental entity does not consider antitrust effects of action).
219 See INDUSTRY, supra note 173, at 159-63. The House Committee Report considered
the potential conflict between antitrust principles and planning activity in considering the
1979 Amendments. Id. at 160; see 1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 47, at 54-56 (Committee
proposed enforcement of antitrust laws in health care areas that respond to classic com-
petitive forces). The 1979 Amendments, however, are silent on the matter of antitrust and
thus provide no basis for implying that Congress intended to give planning agencies power
to insulate activities from antitrust scrutiny. INDUSTRY, supra note 173, at 160. The Na-
tional Gerimedical Court's decision attached significance to several factors whose absence
or presence in a later, more difficult case might indicate the finding of an implied exemp-
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a policy perspective is the argument that courts should apply the antitrust
laws to both voluntary and mandatory planning activities to ensure a com-
prehensive scheme of competition among providers.' An important factor
to consider in the context of mandatory planning activities is that the
regulatory program, as administered, is subject to industry domination
and special party interests." Abdicating judicial control over antitrust
enforcement by authorizing the consideration of antitrust concerns in CON
hearings will not promote a competitive market approach, particularly
when provider groups have little inclination to promote competition by
self-regulation.'
Criticism of the judicial role in health planning through enforcement
of antitrust laws centers on the difficulty of distinguishing procompetitive
from anticompetitive activities.' The conclusion that judicial enforcement
of antitrust principles in the health care industry is the preferable solu-
tion to health care problems, however, does not preclude judicial flexi-
bility in administering the antitrust laws.' Accounting for the advantages
gained by allocating the supply of health services, antitrust enforcers have
the means to weigh the anticompetitive effects of challenged health plan-
ning activities against the need to enforce the competitive market
structure.m The traditional antitrust exemptions retain substantial validity
tion. Id. at 162-63. In National Gerimedical, Blue Cross acted unilaterally as a private party,
so that state action and other defenses were not available. See National Gerimedical Hosp.
& Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378, 391 (1981) (Blue Cross
denied participating hospital status to National Gerimedical in capacity of private business
working in conjunction with HSA). Furthermore, Missouri lacked a law at the time of the
case that would establish a CON program or a state health planning agency. Id. at 390
n.15. No regulatory structure existed in the case that could support a finding of implied
repeal. Id. The local HSA was nongovernmental, advisory planning body, with no authority
to require Blue Cross to act pursuant to its recommendations. Id. at 392. The National
Gerimedica/ case, therefore, provided the court the opportunity to make a decision on the
blanket immunity issue based on a very narrow set of facts. See id. at 393 (National
Gerimedical holding that Planning Act did not create implied blanket antitrust immunity
for planning activities).
See INDUSTRY, supra note 173, at 175-76 (any attempt to ameliorate effect of antitrust
laws in health sector might result in planning agencies' return to noncompetitive habits).
,1 See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (discussion of regulatory control by
providers).
I See New Development, supra note 67, at 656 (CON hearings should determine merits
of competition in proposed conduct.) But see supra text accompanying note 168 (providers
may dominate CON hearings).
221 See INDUSTRY, supra note 173, at 175. Legal difficulty in distinguishing whether a
challenged activity operates to discourage competition may result in decisions that find
unlawful arrangements that actually are efficient. Id. The claims of frustrated efficiency
are not proven, however, and may be the exaggerations of industry interests and planners
who are reluctant to encourage competitive strategies. Id.
211 See M. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 35-36 (because antitrust law is not inflexible the
peculiarities of health care industry may affect application of traditional antitrust rules).
See infra text accompanying notes 225-37 (means to weigh anticompetitive effects
of health planning, activities).
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for exempting some providers from regulatory controls."6 The state action
doctrine will protect planning activities compelled by state law while the
Noerr-Pennington exemption will protect parties seeking to influence
health planning decisions.22 7 The judiciary should invoke antitrust exemp-
tions cautiously, however, to prevent abuses of the exemption privilege.'
To police the exemption policy, courts should analyze carefully the
Supreme Court's limitations on the state action doctrine, as expressed
in the Cantor229 and City of Lafayette"0 decisions, as well as consider the
possibility of a sham action in connection with the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine."
The best method for weighing the anticompetitive effects of planning
activities challenged by antitrust action is the rule of reason approach. 2
Under the rule of reason analysis, courts may consider evidence that the
restraint in question is not unreasonable under the circumstances.' The
application of the rule of reason, as exemplified by the Medical Arts'
and Rex Hospital 5 decisions, thus allows a court to consider the defen-
dant's justifications for the anticompetitive practice rather than rejecting
the activity on a per se basis."' A disinterested judiciary system using
the rule of reason, therefore, is able to balance the competing interests
of the planning laws and antitrust laws."7 By properly focusing judicial
attention on the justification for the challenged practice, the rule of reason
See supra text accompanying notes 78-99 (antitrust exemptions).
See supra text accompanying notes 82-99 (state action and Noerr-Pennington
exemptions).
m See Health Planning, supra note 1, at 337 (liberal application of antitrust exemptions
of health sector protects anticompetitive health planning from liability).
Cantor & Seldon Drugs Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); see supra
notes 87 & 88 and accompanying text (discussion of Cantor holding that state action exemp-
tion does not exist when party causes state to adopt anticompetitive rule).
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); see supra
notes 90 & 91 and accompanying text (discussion of City of Lafayette holding that lesser
governmental entities do enjoy automatic antitrust immunity).
11 See supra notes 93-99 (discussion of Noerr-Pennington doctrine that protects attempts
by private parties to influence governmental units).
See supra text accompanying notes 67-71 (discussion of rule of reason approach).
See supra note 71 and accompanying text (courts employing rule of reason analysis
may consider economic evidence about industry to determine if anticompetitive effects exist).
' Medical Art Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut,
Inc., 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982); see supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text (discussing
Medical Arts).
Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1982); see supra
notes 143-62 and accompanying text (discussion of Rex Hospital).
See supra text accompanying notes 135-62 (discussion of Medical Arts and Rex Hospital
decisions).
See INDUSTRY, supra note 173, at 175-76 (antitrust laws serve as useful check on
planning agencies' tendency to encourage cartel behavior and providers' preference for
collaboration).
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insures that the courts actively will seek to achieve the best interest of
the consumer public by considering all the relevant factors pertaining to
the planning activity."
ELIZABETH ANNE RYAN
See supra text accompanying notes 160 & 162 (defendant bears burden of establishing
that challenged conduct was reasonable restraint).
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